Some company leaders decide that their companies should differentiate themselves from others even though the regulatory establishments such as the European Union and IASB are making elaborate efforts to emphasise comparability and the need for harmonisation of reporting behaviour and governance structures. Under the harmonization regime, decisions to differentiate become strategic in nature and will be placed in the hands of the (supervisory) board. The purpose of our study is to examine the influence of competency and background of supervisory board members on decisions to differentiate in reporting and governance structure. Our contribution to existing knowledge about optimal board compositions is provision of explanations for ability and willingness to make certain critical corporate decisions. In order to identify such explanations, we choose to make an explorative study of the corporate governance codes' general recommendations for board member competencies which can be classified as related to internationalisation, professional background and diversity.
Introduction
Some company leaders decide that their companies should differentiate themselves from others even though the regulatory establishments such as the European Union and IASB are making elaborate efforts to emphasise comparability and the need for harmonisation of reporting behaviour and governance structures. Under the harmonization regime, decisions to differentiate become strategic in nature and will be placed in the hands of the (supervisory) board. The individual board member has the potential to make valuable contributions to board decisions by providing unique perspectives on strategic issues (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003) and can influence key outcomes (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2005) . The principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004, section VI) addresses the responsibilities of the board and links its strategic decisions to the background and competencies of board members. The EU Commission Recommendation on the role of board members suggests that the supervisory board should be composed of members who, as a whole, have the required diversity of knowledge, judgement and experience (EU, 2005) . The presumption is that the nature and quality of strategic decisions are tied to the competency of the board members.
The purpose of our study is to examine the influence of competency and background of supervisory board members on decisions to differentiate in reporting and governance structure. Our contribution to existing knowledge about optimal board compositions is provision of explanations for ability and willingness to make certain critical corporate decisions. In order to identify such explanations, we choose to make an explorative study of the corporate governance codes' general recommendations for board member competencies which can be classified as related to internationalisation, professional background and diversity. We examine four specific instances of observed differentiation behaviour, i.e. two instances of disclosure behaviour: Voluntary IFRS implementation and high level of CG disclosure and two instances involving choice of governance structure: the abandonment of joint audit (change from two to one auditor) and the choice to use audit committee as part of the company governance structure.
Harmonisation of laws and standards is an international phenomenon driving a number of the changes facing listed companies. Purposeful differentiation in a harmonisation context is not a contradiction. In contrast to the process of standardisation, harmonisation still allows diversity (McLeay et al., 1999 , Haller, 2002 . It is a recognised part of dealing with the harmonisation process that companies possess differing capacity for regulatory changes. Differences tend to materialise in two forms, namely: (1) differentiation from other companies by moving first and/or (2) differentiation from other companies by deciding on a higher level of corporate transparency or trustworthiness though governance structures. Differentiation behaviour is consistent with a resource-based perspective on competitive advantage as a driver for business strategy. Lado et al. (1992) suggest a resource-based perspective as an alternative to more deterministic derived from neoclassical economic theory. The latter type views competitive advantage as a consequence of market or industry pressures to which the company must respond via differentiation (e.g., Porter, 1998) . The resource-based perspective is based on the premise that company-specific competencies are potential rent-yielding strategic assets and these competencies "are consciously and systematically developed by the wilful choices and actions of the firm's strategic leaders," (Lado et al., 1992 , 78) . Hence, the resource-based perspective can explain differences between reporting models and corporate governance arrangements. In the corporate governance literature, another theoretical explanation for a corporate willingness to differentiate is found in agency theory (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007 , Coles et al., 2001 , Li, 1994 . The prediction is that a reduction of asymmetric information through higher levels of corporate transparency or trustworthiness will lead to a reduction in the cost of capital (Botosan et al., 2004 , Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005 , Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000 .
Our study is based on collected financial and corporate governance data for 100 listed Across these four differentiation decisions we find varying support for the three recommended types of competencies of board members. We find that IFRS implementation is related to board competency indicated by having foreigner board members on the supervisory board (internationalisation effect), while the other reporting decision (the choice of high corporate governance disclosure level) is related to board competency of all the three types identified in the corporate governance codes, i.e., internationalisation effect, professional background in accounting/finance and gender diversity. We find that governance structure involving the abandonment of joint audits is unrelated to competency measures. Finally we find that differentiation by introducing audit committees is mostly related to the internationalisation effect.
These observations suggest that company leaders in Denmark have sought a competitive advantage through differentiation in the part of the value chain directed toward the capital market. The globalisation of business has been accompanied by a harmonisation of disclosure requirements in terms of accounting rules (e.g., Godfrey and Chalmers, 2007, Baker and Barbu, 2007) and corporate governance recommendations (Chua et al., 2007 , Luo, 2005 . Hence, similar observations of differentiation would be expected in other countries, although the particular changes would be closely related to the particular governance setting of the individual country.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide the motivation and literature review as basis for developing hypotheses on the relationship between differentiation decisions and the competencies of decision makers. In section 3 we describe the methodology, i.e., the particularities of the collected dataset and the model development. In section 4 we provide the analyses and results on the critical decisions. We conclude the paper in section 5.
Motivation and literature review
In this section we provide the motivation and literature review as the basis for developing testable hypotheses. The section is divided in two subsections. In the first subsection, we introduce the context of harmonisation of financial reporting and corporate governance disclosure as a vantage point for company differentiation and we identify possible differentiation behaviour through critical corporate governance decisions in the context of regulatory changes. In the second subsection we develop hypotheses related to the competencies of the potential decision makers at the supervisory boards when facing the critical corporate governance decisions.
Differentiation in a harmonisation environment
Differentiation through the choice of reporting and governance structure should be examined and understood in the context of a overall harmonisation environment. Godfrey and Chalmers (2007, 8) argue that global accounting standards are adopted in order to attract, or restrict the loss of, foreign investment in a national capital market. Baker and Barbu (2007) review over 200 research articles published between 1965 and 2004 that deal with international accounting harmonization. They pinpoint a number of important events on the accounting harmonization timeline (Baker and Barbu, 2007, 275 In an international comparison Chua et al. (2007) find that both corporate governance regime and the degree of capital market openness play a significant role in explaining corporate valuation. The reason is that restricted capital market regimes discourage international investments while open capital markets will promote a more efficient risk sharing among international investors, which results in lower costs of capital and higher corporate valuation (Chua et al., 2007, 37) . Luo (2005) stresses the importance of corporate accountability in the context of corporate governance for multinational companies:
"Corporate accountability interrelates to corporate governance because it affects the credibility of information needed to support important activities, such as the creation and existence of enforceable contracts (e.g., manager compensation contracts contingent on performance results), the monitoring of managers by the board of directors and outside investors and regulators, and the exercise of investor rights as governed by securities laws," (Luo, 2005, 22) . Differentiation can be possible at the outset of (before) new mandatory requirements or related to voluntary disclosures. In relation to new mandatory requirements companies may become "first movers" as suggested by prior research on early adopters of financial reporting requirements (e.g., Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007 , Daske, 2006 , Hoogendoorn, 2006 . It could be that they are seeking to benefit from first mover advantages, while the "followers" are trying to benefit from "free rider" advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) . First movers will try to benefit from increased or maintained reputation in the capital market (as well as societal image effects). However, being first movers will have costs, i.e., direct, proprietary and liability costs (Healy and Palepu, 2001, Kalss, 2007) .
In relation to voluntary disclosure the differentiation is a matter of certain companies deciding to disclose more financial information (e.g., Gray et al., 1995 , Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007 , Scott, 1994 and/or non-financial information (e.g., Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005, Eng and Mak, 2003) than other companies. The paradox is that the companies are trying to stand out by making reporting decisions which make them similar in a global environment. Hence, this is a relative gesture on the part of international oriented compared to national oriented companies. However, in an international context these companies are benchmarking at an accepted (presumable higher) level.
In this study we examine four specific instances of observed differentiation behaviour, i.e. two instances of disclosure behaviour: Voluntary IFRS implementation and high level of CG disclosure and two instances involving choice of governance structure: the abandonment of joint audit (change from two to one auditor) and the choice to use audit committee as part of the company governance structure.
Voluntary IFRS implementation
Voluntary IFRS implementation has been considered in prior studies (e.g., Daske and Gebhardt, 2006 , Moya and Oliveras, 2006 , Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007 
Corporate Governance Disclosure
In prior studies the level of corporate governance disclosure has been considered as the appropriate choice variable (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005 , Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007 , Eng and Mak, 2003 . This is because the disclosure in this area is not a matter of absolute but relative disclose, i.e., all companies disclosure corporate governance related items to a certain extent. Hence, the reporting decision will be concerned with the level of disclosure (transparency level), i.e., differentiation behaviour equates a high disclosure level. 23 of 100 companies in our dataset are characterized in this way. 
Abandonment of joint audits (from two auditors to one)
While joint audits are generally allowed in most European countries they seldom take place in practice (European Commission, 2001) . In a few countries like France and Denmark, the joint audits have been institutionalized as part of the audit regulation (Francis et al., 2006 , Piot, 2007 . The tradition of the two auditor (joint auditor) system in Denmark was discussed before the implementation of the 4 th , 7 th and 8 th directive and it was not considered incompatible with the harmonization of the accounting and auditing 
Audit Committees
According to the EU recommendation on independence of management (2005), the appointment of sub-committees is intended to support the supervisory board's independence of the day-to-day management and increase efficiency. The EU recommendation presumes the appointment of nomination, remuneration and audit committees, but allows the companies to appoint fewer than three sub-committees.
Prior studies have examined factors associated with the presence of audit committees (Carson, 2002, Chau and Leung, 2006) . The function and purposes of board subcommittees such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees are naturally tied to the size of the board. Findings by Yermack (1996) were consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective. These findings have been supported by later studies (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2006 , de Andres et al., 2005 , Mak and Kusnadi, 2005 . This suggest that the negative relationship between board size and firm value transcends different corporate governance systems (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005) . Ahmed et al. (2006) found that earnings informativeness is negatively related to board size but is not related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board. However, in a prior study in the Danish two-tier board setting, Rose (2005) found that board size does not affect the company performance (as proxied by Tobin's Q).
The 2001 corporate governance recommendations the Nørby Committee stated that "most company boards are not so large that they require the establishment of board committees in order to be able to manage their tasks, and therefore appointments of board committees the incremental steps of the code revision process in the previous section). This relates to the way the sub-committees were described in the 2001 code where it was stated that "as a rule, if the board appoints a committee, this should only be done in order to prepare decisions that must be reached by all of the directors." In effect, the code did not allow an audit committee to function sufficiently independent from the supervisory board.
In the 2005 code the decision to have an audit committee is still identified as a voluntary exception: "In companies with complex accounting and audit conditions, the supervisory board should consider establishing an audit committee to assist the supervisory board in accounting and audit matters," (CSE, 2005) . The decision to establish an audit committee was made by 12 of the 100 companies in our dataset.
Explaining differentiation by competencies of decision makers
The willingness and the ability to make critical corporate governance decisions depend on the composition of the board and the resources of the company. It is asserted that the type of decision maker on the supervisory board will influence the decisions made by listed companies. Corporate governance recommendations for supervisory boards tie strategic decisions and board member competencies (CSE, 2005 , EU, 2005 , OECD, 2004 . Specifically, the recommendations for listed companies in Denmark identify international experience, professional background and diversity of the board as potential necessary competencies (CSE, 2005) . While our examination of these recommendations is explorative in nature, the theories underlying the specific context we consider are "resource-based explanations" for the companies' ability to sustain competitive advantage by differentiating behaviour (Lado et al., 1992) and "agency thery/asymmetric information explanations" for the willingness to differentiate (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007 , Coles et al., 2001 , Li, 1994 .
The importance of international experience by board members have been considered in prior studies (e.g., Luo, 2005 , Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003 , Rose, 2006 , Ruigrok et al., 2007 . In a prior study of listed companies in Denmark, Rose (2006) supported other studies that the international dimension of the board increases with the size of the company. One benefit from international experience at the board may be "to reduce the information processing costs of globalisation "because more culturally diversified top management teams and corporate boards have greater processing capacity and can attend to more environmental cues and foreign liability problems" (Luo, 2005, 34) . International experience can be accomplished by including native board members with international experience (such as board membership in foreign subsidiaries) or by including foreign board members on the supervisory board.
The composition of supervisory boards has been examined in a number of prior studies considering the importance of diversity (e.g., Erhardt et al., 2003 , Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003 , Kang et al., 2007 , Ruigrok et al., 2007 . Diversity in the composition of boards may include such factors as age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, independence, professional background, knowledge, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry experience, career and life experience. Danish boards are actually characterized by having a relatively low degree of diversity (Rose, 2006 We explore the basis for differentiation through the choice of reporting and governance structure. In this study we examine four specific instances of differentiation decisions for each hypothesis. The study is explorative because we cannot predict the exact nature of the individual relationship between decisions and competency of decision makers.
However, we choose to present the hypotheses in the positive form in order to align the predictions with the CG codes' general recommendations for board member competencies identified as international experience, professional background and diversity.
International experience effect H1:
The propensity to make differentiation decisions about reporting and governance structure in listed companies will be higher when the decision makers on the supervisory board include foreign board members or board members with international experience.
Professional background effect H2:
The propensity to make differentiation decisions about reporting and governance structure in listed companies will be higher when the decision makers on the supervisory board include board members with specific professional background (i.e., lawyer, accounting/finance experience, sales/marketing experience, specific industry experience).
Diversity effect H3:
The propensity to make differentiation decisions about reporting and governance structure in listed companies will be higher when the decision makers on the supervisory board have different background (diversity in gender, employee board participation and professional background).
Methodology
In this section we first describe the dataset and the variables applied. Second we present the models used to test the hypotheses developed in section 2. Finally we provide some initial descriptive statistics.
Dataset and variables
The The dependent variables in our study are the four corporate governance decisions identified in section 2.2. The measures consist of four dummy variables. We examine the effect on the corporate governance decision through our three hypotheses with independent variables including board member characteristics as international experience (two variables), professional background (four variables), board diversity (three variables) and company specific control variables (three variables).
The following board member characteristics are measured as dummy variables. We also constructed an alternative diversity variable used as independent variable: Diversity (composite); a composite measure using a nominal scale from 0 to 5 with one point for each board characteristic of the following: international experience, accounting/finance experience, sales/marketing experience, industry experience and lawyer.
Measures of risk, performance and size of the board have been applied as control variables in a number of corporate governance studies due to the possible mitigating effects of these variables (e.g., Barontini and Caprio, 2006 , Krivogorsky, 2006 , Larcker et al., 2007 . We have collected and examined 18 company specific control variables as possible candidates. We choose a representative for each of these, i.e, "Beta" as measure for risk and "ROIC three year average" as performance measure. "Board size" is strongly correlated with company size and also control for different potential for diversity.
Models
In order to examine the three overall hypotheses we use logistic regression models, i.e., one for each of the four differentiation decisions testing each hypothesis separately (resulting in 12 individual models). In addition, we formulated a reduced model for each decision with the most relevant variable identified in the initial analysis as predictor (resulting in four models). The models for the differentiation decisions all have the same structure, i.e., measuring the possible board member effects of international experience, professional background or diversity, and controlling for the same company specific control variables, see tables 4-7.
Descriptive statistics
We provide descriptive statistics for the sample in tables 1, 2 and 3. First, we notice that the composition of the supervisory boards generally has an uneven distribution across the 100 listed companies. Because the board member characteristics are coded as dummy variables we only provide the actual frequencies in 
Analyses
In this section we examine the hypothesized relationships between instances of differentiation decisions and decision maker competencies. We make two explorative steps starting with a closer examination of the three hypotheses and following up with further analyses based on all effects models.
Hypotheses tests
The hypothesised competency effects may coincide with the background factors for a particular company. Therefore the main findings are presented in the form of models controlling for such factors. The first explorative step is to examine the three hypotheses one by one.
In table 4, we show the results for the models testing internationalisation effects (H1).
The panels in table 4 each reflect one of the four differentiation decisions. Overall, three of the four logistic regression models exploring international effects are significant. We find that having foreign board members affect the two reporting decisions of voluntary IFRS implementation and high corporate governance disclosure level. In relation to governance structure, the decision to abandon joint audits is not affected by international experience, while the decision to have an audit committee is significantly related to having foreign board participation. Our findings support H1 when using the foreigner measure, but only the differentiation through higher corporate governance disclosure is also affected by our international experience measure. In relation to the decision to abandon joint audits it is noticeable that negative directions are captured in the parameter estimates for foreigners and for board size (board size is positively correlated with foreigners on the board).
<insert Table 4 about here> Our findings support claims made in prior studies regarding foreign board members possible influence on reporting and governance structure. Oxelheim and Randøy examine the importance of outsider Anglo-American board memberships in a Skandinavian setting (listed companies in Norway and Sweden). They suggest that foreign board membership "enhances the international orientation of the firm, and serves as a catalyst for further globalization of a corporation," (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003, 2388) . The globalisation of the capital markets will affect the reporting behaviour of companies: "at a minimum, big investors are demanding international standards of corporate behaviour, accounting clarity, and disclosure," (Li, 1994, 366-367) .
Hence, our hypothesis H1 is supported for the differentiation decision about voluntary IFRS implementation. The Odds ratio (exponential to the parameter estimate) for the competency measured by the foreigner variable is 4.6, i.e., suggesting that it is 4.6 as likely to decide on IFRS implementation when the supervisory board includes foreigners.
The three year average on ROIC is negatively related to the decision (significant at the 5 percent level). This suggests that voluntary IFRS implementation was related to low performance using accounting measures (while not tabulated, this finding is supported using one year ROIC for the year of change and also using alternative performance measures). The same is not true for the other reporting decision. Corporate governance disclosure level is partly explained by board size (and company size), but not performance. This differentiation decision is significantly related to larger companies as well as the internationalisation effect. In relation to the audit committee decision, we find that both board size and risk (beta) affects the differentiation behaviour.
We provide an overview of the models testing the professional background effects (H2) in table 5. Only two of the four models are significant at the 1 percent level. While the model for IFRS implementation is not significant, the professional background in sales/marketing is marginally significant at the 10 percent level. The Odds ratio suggests that it is 2.8 as likely to implement IFRS when the competencies of the board include prior sales/marketing experience. The two significant models relate to corporate governance disclosure and the audit committee differentiation decisions.
Accounting/finance experience is a professional background which affects the chosen corporate governance disclosure level. It is 4.1 as likely to have a high disclosure level when having accounting/finance competence present in the supervisory board. None of the professional background variables account for the significant model for audit committee choice. Instead this differentiation decision is entirely driven by risk, (negative) performance and board size. It is noticeable that the model for "two auditors to one" identifies sales/marketing experience as a positive factor in explaining the abandonment of joint audits (Odds ratio of 2.3 at the 10 percent significance level). Here the board size is negatively related to the differentiation decision (significant at the 10 percent level), i.e., smaller rather than larger boards prefer to differentiate.
<insert Table 5 about here>   In table 6 , we show the findings related to diversity effects (H3). We find support for this hypothesis in two of the four differentiation decisions. Similar to the possible effects of professional background (H2), diversity provides possible explanations for differentiation though corporate governance disclosure and audit committee choice. Diversity is measured three different ways. The measure involving gender (women present or not) is significant at the 5 percent level for the corporate governance disclosure. In this model, the composite measure is also significant at the 1 percent level. The more diversified in terms of professional background, the larger the propensity to provide high level of corporate governance disclosure. We notice, that this model also is explained by board size and that the only diversity measure which is significantly correlated by board size is the employee measure. The differentiation through audit committees is very similar to the disclosure model, although the gender effect is not present. We also notice that the composite measure is significant at the 5 percent level. This provides an insight in the context of the internationalisation effect (which was present) and the professional background effect (which was not). Recall that the composite measure is a cumulative measure for the five experience types including international, accounting/finance, sales/marketing, industry and lawyer.
<insert Table 6 about here>
Tests of all effects models
We provide an overview of the second explorative step in testing the three hypothesised competency effects in table 7. Here we use results from the first step to specify reduced logistic regression models. We include one independent variable for each competency effect if such an effect was detected in the first step of the analysis. Whenever there is a choice of variables for the effect, we have based the choice on the size of significance level and Odds ratio indicated in the first models (see tables 6 to 8).
In the all effects models, we obtain significant overall models for all differentiation decision except the abandonment of joint audits decision. The IFRS implementation is affected by the internationalisation effect as measured by the foreigner variable. In contrast to the individual model for professional background, the sales marketing effect is not significant in the all effects model. The explanatory effect of poor performance (ROIC) is also present. The model chi-square is 14.2 which is close to the comparable test statistic for the model specifying only internationalisation effects (see table 4 ).
The second reporting decision involving corporate governance disclosure is affect by all three competency effects measured respectively as international experience, accounting/finance experience and gender diversity. In the all effects model, the board size is also a significant explanatory variable.
As we indicated, only the governance structure differentiation model for audit committees is significant for the all effects test. In this model the gender diversity is marginally significant at the 10 percent level, while the internationalisation effect is significant at the 5 percent level. The Odds ratio for the foreigner variable is 44.8.
Therefore it seems reasonable to surmise that foreign board members inspire the choice of audit committees. Risk and board size are significant explanatory variables in this model.
<insert Table 7 about here>
Conclusion
Some company leaders decide that their companies should differentiate themselves from others even though the regulatory establishments such as the European Union and IASB are making elaborate efforts to emphasise comparability and the need for harmonisation of reporting behaviour and governance structures. Under the harmonization regime, decisions to differentiate become strategic in nature and will be placed in the hands of the (supervisory) board. We are able to observe that some company leaders alter reporting behaviour and corporate governance features before and to a higher extent than comparable companies. Corporate governance recommendations for (supervisory) boards tie strategic decisions with board member competencies such as international experience, professional background and diversity of the board.
We identify four instances of strategic differentiation observed among Danish listed companies in [2004] [2005] . Such differentiation behaviour is predicted by theory, i.e., we consider "resource-based explanations" for the companies' ability to sustain competitive advantage by differentiating behaviour and "agency theory/asymmetric information explanations" for the willingness to differentiate. Two of the differentiation decisions are related to reporting and two are related two governance structures. For the first reporting decision we find that the IFRS first mover (voluntary IFRS disclosure in the financial year 2004) is related to board competency indicated by foreigners (internationalisation effect), i.e., H1 is supported for this differentiation decision. The second reporting decision is the choice of high corporate governance disclosure level. This differentiation decision is related to board competency of all the three types identified in the corporate governance codes, i.e., H1 (international experience), H2 (accounting background) and H3 (gender diversity) are all supported for this differentiation decision. We find that governance structure involving the abandonment of joint audits is unrelated to competency measures in every model we tested. In contrast we find support for H1, and marginally support for H3, when considering differentiation by introducing audit committees in the governance structure.
Our contribution to existing knowledge about optimal board compositions is provision of explanations for ability and willingness to make certain critical corporate decisions. The explanations should be considered in light of our purposive exploratory study of the corporate governance codes' general recommendations for board member competencies.
The practical implications of our study are related to regulatory requirements for board composition and competencies and to actual board composition in context specific scenarios for listed companies. 5 The data was originally collected to map out the extent to which Danish companies comply with domestic and international corporate governance standards. In an effort to reduce errors and misunderstandings, the sample companies have been asked to read the tables with their own data and to point out incorrect information. A full list of attributes in the data set is available upon request to the authors.
6 In this study we do not use 47 of the variables in the full dataset. Four of the variables are unrelated background variables such as "total audit fee" and "number of analysts following the company", while 32
are identified as conditioned variables (as an example: if the age of each board member is disclosed, conditioned variables would be "age of youngest board member"; "age of oldest board member" and "average age of board members"). The remaining 11 variables, which we do not use, are control variable (untabulated results are available). 
